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Which Policy Attributes Affect Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Uptake Among Ukrainian Evacuees in Japan?

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ABSTRACT

What attributes of assisted voluntary return and remigration (AVRR) policies are likely to increase acceptance? Governments have put increasing efforts into remigration, or the return of migrants to their countries of origin. Whereas existing research has focused extensively on the determinants of policy choices, the efficacy of particular policies enacted by governments, as well as other push/pull factors in the host and origin societies that influence remigration choices, there is little work on what attributes of an AVRR policy influence policy uptake. To this end, we conducted a randomised conjoint survey on 242 Ukrainian evacuees in Japan from June to July 2024 which at the time accommodated approximately 2600 Ukrainians fleeing the 2022 Russian invasion. We find that factors such as guarantee of housing in an area less affected by conflict and the identity of the policy provider increase policy acceptance probability. Surprisingly, even large increases in one-time payments had little influence on policy uptake. This paper is the first application of conjoint experiments to study which features of AVRR policy affect acceptance probability. This approach would be useful globally to understand the preferences of potential AVRR policy recipients in diverse contexts.

1 | Introduction

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines AVRR as 'administrative, logistical or financial support, including reintegration assistance, to migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country or country of transit and who decide to return to their country of origin' (IOM 2004, 12–13). AVRR has been a major policy tool for promoting remigration by host governments through international organisations since at least the 1970s (Kalicki 2020).

AVRR is a set of policies whereby host governments provide free airfare alongside cash payments and other forms of assistance to encourage migrants to return voluntarily to their home countries, instead of resorting to costly, often difficult and controversial forced deportations (Black et al. 2011). Such policies began in the 1970s in Western European countries in an attempt to repatriate migrant workers, later expanding to asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Over 100 countries now implement such policies, and the UN-related organisation International Organization for Migration (IOM) facilitates international cooperation for such policies (Kalicki 2020).

In many instances, scholars have questioned whether AVRR policies are truly voluntary—in many instances, the returns are not truly voluntary, or the migrant is forced to choose

between AVRR and deportation without any financial aid (Webber 2011). Many scholars also question the effectiveness of the reintegration component (Flahaux 2017). Most importantly for this paper, many AVRR policies typically result in very low uptake rates out of those eligible for such policies (OECD 2020). Thus, these policies are not always attractive to those eligible.

In this article, we ask what features of AVRR policies influence the decision of potential policy recipients to accept or reject them. While debates persist regarding its effectiveness (Kalicki 2020) and whether it is truly voluntary or if there is some element of coercion in these policies (Black et al. 2011; Erdal and Oeppen 2022), remarkably few papers have causally examined the impact of specific policy attributes on uptake by target groups. This is especially surprising given the extensive financial investment and international institutional infrastructure set up for this policy, as well as the extensive research into the aspects of host and home regions on intent to remigrate. This research identifies different 'push' and 'pull' factors that drive remigration decisions (Borjas and Bratsberg 1994). Recent research on refugee remigration shows that conditions back home (pull factors) greatly influence remigration. Safety is a major factor, as are the economic conditions, public services and the availability of social networks (Alrababah et al. 2023). Conversely, 'push' factors such as the level of integration and hostility from the locals in the host country (Braithwaite et al. 2022) can also drive remigration intent. The migrant's individual attributes are also known to influence remigration decisions; exposure to violence, social ties (Ghosn et al. 2021), as well as the level of education (van Tubergen et al. 2024), can also influence remigration.

Crucially, many of these factors are related to the conditions back home, which host governments cannot easily influence. Thus, aside from increasing negative pressure, providing information and providing education or training, there is a limit to what host governments can do to incentivise remigration. Host governments have sometimes resorted to direct military interventions to create secure areas to repatriate migrants to, which was the stated justification for the 2019 Turkish military intervention in Syria (Gall 2019). Yet, this is not an option available to most hosts. Unlike these drivers of remigration, however, host governments have greater flexibility to adjust their AVRR policy packages.

Thus, the aim of this study was to understand what features of an AVRR package influence remigration. Our approach provides a vital tool for policymakers on factors they can easily implement. To identify the impact of AVRR policy features, mainly financial assistance, training, policy implementer, investment and safety guarantees, on willingness to accept the policy, we conducted a survey on a sample of 242 Ukrainian evacuees[1] in Japan (out of a population of around 2600) displaced by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. We employ a randomised conjoint experiment (RCE) to estimate the causal impact of changing each policy feature on the probability of the respondent choosing that option, relative to the baseline. This work is, to our knowledge, the first application of this method to AVRR policy design. This paper shows that experimentally manipulating AVRR policy features using RCEs allows researchers and policymakers to understand which policy features (that the host government can actually change) influence policy uptake and are relatively more valuable for the migrants themselves.

When choosing between alternative hypothetical AVRR policies (internal choice), policy attributes such as assistance, housing support, resettlement location guarantee, skill training, provider and business loan significantly affect respondent choice. However, when governments typically offer AVRR policies, recipients choose between accepting the policy and the status quo. When choosing between accepting the AVRR policy and the status quo (external choice), we find that most factors thought to affect AVRR policy uptake have little impact on respondents' choices. Few factors affect policy uptake, aside from guarantees of relative safety (guarantee of housing in Western Ukraine as opposed to no guarantee; Western Ukraine is considerably less exposed to the war than Eastern Ukraine), the country implementing the policy (United States over Ukraine) and a substantial business loan (20,000 US dollars).

Crucially, we find that substantially increasing the hypothetical monetary incentive from 1200 US dollars (a typical sum for AVRR policies) to an amount as high as 12,000 US dollars[2] has little effect on the choice to accept the return policy. Coupled with the high baseline willingness to accept such policies (78%), this research shows that while many Ukrainian evacuees may be willing to return with even less costly policies, increasing the monetary value of the financial aid package may have little impact on those who were not willing to return to begin with. The following section explains the situation of Ukrainian evacuees in Japan following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by an illustration of the data collection, experimental design, and analysis. The discussion section concludes the paper.

1.1 | The 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Ukrainian Evacuees in Japan

In 2022, following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a large number of Ukrainians were internally displaced and fled the country as refugees. Out of a prewar population of 44 million, approximately 7 million Ukrainian refugees have been recorded abroad, with another 4 million displaced internally. The bulk of Ukrainian refugees reside in Russia, Germany and Poland, each housing around 1 million (UNRIC 2024). Japan currently houses around 2600 Ukrainian evacuees, making Japan a relatively insignificant host of Ukrainian refugees. However, given the historically restrictive policy regarding refugee inflows and designation as evacuees rather than refugees, Ukrainians represent a large portion of Japan's refugee population (the current refugee population is 1400, through UNHCR persons of concern number 25,800) (UNHCR 2024).

As of June–July 2024, Ukrainian evacuees in Japan have faced several challenges in integration and self-reliance. According to a survey conducted by the Nippon Foundation from July 18th to August 31st 2024, around half of the evacuees above the age of 18 were employed, with around 20% searching for a job while undergoing skills and language training. In a separate

question regarding needed aid, 43% expressed a need for aid in finding employment and skills training, which was the top item. Language acquisition was mixed, with a quarter of respondents saying they are not fluent at all, 40% reporting limited fluency, 25% reporting daily-level fluency, and 10% reporting high levels of fluency (The Nippon Foundation 2024b). According to another survey conducted earlier from March 11th to April 20th 2024, 41% of respondents expressed a wish to stay in Japan as long as possible, with 33% of respondents expressing a wish to stay until the situation in Ukraine stabilises, with 23% unsure and around 3% wishing to return or move to a third country (The Nippon Foundation 2024a).

The battlefield situation at the time was characterised by slow but steady Russian gains prior to the spectacular Ukrainian offensives into Russia in August 2024 and the increased tempo of Russian gains and intensified aerial attacks (War Mapper 2025; Mappes 2025). Therefore, the outcome of the conflict was and remains uncertain at the time of writing.

The Nippon Foundation, a private nonprofit which has taken on a major role in aiding Ukrainians in Japan, provides travel to Japan and yearly financial support of one million yen (about USD 6800) per person (Sasakawa 2024). Regarding existing AVRR policies, the Nippon Foundation currently offers assistance to those who are permanently returning to Ukraine. They offer a one-time payment of JPY 300,000 (USD 2000) per person to assist with the return to Ukraine and the registration of flights from Narita Airport to Warsaw by Polish airlines (Sasakawa 2024). Some European governments have also announced plans to introduce one-time payments to Ukrainian refugees who want to return. Switzerland may offer CHF 1000 to 4000 per person (between USD 1000 and 4400). Ireland is also considering financial incentives for Ukrainian refugees. Norway is already offering NOK 17,500 (approximately EUR 1500). The 'REAG/GARP 2.0' program, which offers one-time assistance of up to EUR 1000, and up to EUR 200 per ticket back to the country of origin, is available to all refugees in Germany. This policy will be applied to Ukrainians once the conflict subsides (Lapa and Bolotov 2024).

2 | Experiment Design and Analysis

2.1 | Data Collection

The survey was conducted using face-to-face interviews with a web-based questionnaire hosted on Qualtrics and administered via tablet, link or QR code, alongside responses collected from Facebook groups. The face-to-face interviews were mainly conducted by attending gatherings of Ukrainians in Japan, mainly cultural festivals such as the 2024 Ivana Kupala festival that was held in Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture in July 2024. The data collection period ran from 5 June to 22 July 2024, in Okayama and Tokyo Prefectures, as most evacuees reside in the Tokaido region. Through this method, the authors were able to obtain responses from 242 Ukrainian evacuees in Japan, which constitutes approximately 10% of the total population. Participation was entirely voluntary, and respondents had the option to decline to answer any specific questions. Table 1 shows basic characteristics of the sample.

TABLE 1 | Participant characteristics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	242	30.99	14.77	18	100
Gender (male)	242	0.24	0.43	0	1
Marital status (married)	242	0.56	0.49	0	1
Number of children	105	1.59	0.49	0	1

2.2 | Experimental Design

Following a basic background questionnaire, each respondent ranked five randomly generated pairs of hypothetical AVRR policy packages. A respondent faces a choice set with three alternatives: two packages (Choice A and Choice B) with randomly selected levels of the attributes from Table 2 and a status quo scenario (Choice C). Respondents were asked to rank the three alternatives. Table 3 shows a hypothetical choice that a respondent may be asked to rank. The survey text explained to the respondents that the status quo option represented a situation in which the respondent maintained their current situation.

The first attribute is the direct financial assistance that a policy recipient would get. To understand the impact of increasing the financial assistance, the respondents were shown sums that varied from USD 1500 to USD 12,000 with increments of USD 3000 and USD 6000. These values were chosen because, as the discussion about European AVRR policies shows, 1500 is a typical sum for such schemes, and we wished to examine whether increasing the sum would impact policy uptake. Given an economic logic, one should expect substantial increases in financial assistance to increase uptake.

The second attribute is housing support. Housing is a central concern for returning evacuees, as their original domiciles may have been damaged, inaccessible or unsafe. Thus, we measure the impact of guaranteeing housing support for 3 months, 6 months, 1 year and 2 years.

The third attribute is guarantee of housing in Western Ukraine. While all of Ukraine is subject to the conflict, with even the far western regions sustaining airstrikes and suffering from blackouts, the bulk of the civilian casualties are occurring in areas adjacent to the front line, mainly in the east of Ukraine (OHCHR 2023). Thus, it is possible to ascertain whether guarantees of housing in relative safety will influence policy uptake, especially given the importance placed on safety as a motivator for remigration in the existing literature.

The fourth attribute is employment support, a feature of the 'reintegration' component of some existing AVRR programs (Aucoin 2022; Sylla and Cold-Ravnkilde 2023). Therefore, we can see whether offering skill training may make the policy more attractive over not doing so.

Including the fifth attribute enables us to examine whether the identity of the policy implementer has any impact on uptake. Host

TABLE 2 | Table of attributes.

Attributes	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
1. Financial Assistance	$1500	$3000	$6000	$12,000
2. Housing Support	3 months	6 months	1 year	2 years
3. Guarantee of Being Housed in Western Ukraine	No guarantee	Guarantee		
4. Employment Support	No support	Skill training		
5. Provider (Implementer of this Policy)	Ukraine	USA	EU	Japan
6. Business Loan	No Loan	$5000	$10,000	$20,000

TABLE 3 | Conjoint example.

Scenario: 'We would like to propose a hypothetical compensation policy package designed for refugees in Japan who are considering a return to Ukraine. We assume that the proposed compensation package will support and encourage the voluntary return of Ukrainian refugees to your country of origin. In the evaluation process, you will be asked to rank three choice sets: Alternative A, alternative B and alternative C (status quo). Selecting alternative C indicates a preference for the existing compensation package, implying that a new policy is not needed. For each choice set, please rank the options as follows: (1) most preferred choice, (2) second preferred choice, and (3) least preferred choice. You will complete this ranking process five times, with different combinations of compensation package attributes presented each time'

Attributes	Choice A	Choice B	Choice C
1. Financial Assistance	$1500	$6000	Status quo
2. Housing Support	6 months	1 year	
3. Guarantee of Being Housed in Western Ukraine	Guarantee	No guarantee	
4. Employment	Skill training	Skill training	
5. Provider (Implementer of this Policy)	Ukraine	Japan	
6. Loan for Business (in Case of New Business)	$10,000	$20,000	
Rank	1 X	1 O	1 O
	2 O	2 O	2 X
	3 O	3 X	3 O

Note: The example conjoint has been filled out for the respondent who most prefers choice A, followed by C and B.

states may delegate the reintegration part of the policy to the government of the target country, or some other entity, or implement the policy directly, that is, through the host country's foreign aid agency. Many governments of refugees' country of origin suffer from endemic corruption, lack of capacity and low levels of trust.

Ukraine is no different; despite a decade of reform and some improvements, perceptions of corruption are still high (Cifuentes-Faura 2024), and trust in some government institutions, such as the legislature (21%), government overall (39%) and local government (50%) is below majority, though trust in the military (94%) and the president (76%) remains relatively high (Hrushetskyi 2023). Such a lack of trust in the government of the country of origin may lead to better uptake if a more trusted foreign entity were implementing the policy. Thus, we show the impact of specifying the USA, the EU and Japan as policy implementers over specifying Ukraine as the implementer.

Finally, given the need to build and sustain a viable livelihood upon returning, some AVRR programs provide assistance in starting a business in the form of training and loans (Aucoin 2022; Sylla and Cold-Ravnkilde 2023). This shows the impact of providing loans of USD 5000, 10,000, or 20,000 on policy uptake compared to no loan.

2.3 | Estimation Method

The identification strategy used in this paper is a randomised conjoint experiment, following the approach outlined by Hainmueller et al. (2014). This method ensures that the assignment of attribute levels is random, allowing researchers to estimate causal effects using simple mean differences. Our primary objective is to estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE) on both internal and external choice probabilities. The internal choice probability refers to the probability of preferring one alternative over another when directly compared in a forced choice between two different AVRR policy packages. In contrast, external choice probability refers to the probability of preferring a given AVRR policy package over an external opt-out option.

To estimate AMCE, the analysis employs a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. In the instance of the internal choice analysis, each observation is one choice, or a bundle of attributes (an AVRR policy package) that was shown to a respondent. The outcome variable is constructed as a dummy variable equal to 1 when that choice is ranked above the other policy bundle. For the external choice, each observation is the same as above, but the outcome is equal to 1 when the respondent ranks that policy package above the external choice (status quo).

The coefficient of interest quantifies the AMCEs, representing the average change in the probability of choosing an alternative due to the corresponding attribute level. This linear framework allows us to directly estimate the effects of each attribute level on the respondents' choice probabilities. Errors are clustered at the level of individual respondents. Additional results using marginal means following the method presented in Leeper et al. (2020, 4) and logistic regression are shown in the Data S1.

3 | Results

Figure 1 presents the AMCEs of the attribute levels for both internal and external choice probabilities. The attributes and their respective levels are listed on the left side of the figure. The two panels display estimates for the external and internal choice probabilities, respectively. The solid circles represent the point estimates of the AMCEs, which capture the marginal effect of each attribute level within the AVRR policy package. The horizontal bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

3.1 | External Choice Probability

The external choice probability compares alternative AVRR packages with the opt-out option, which, in this context, reflects the decision of Ukrainian evacuees not to return to Ukraine. This is the most realistic analysis, as those who are offered AVRR typically choose between accepting and not accepting, rather than between two different AVRR policies. As shown in Table S1, the constant term indicates that 75% of respondents prefer the baseline option, suggesting that even with minimal support, most Ukrainian evacuees express a willingness to return home. Across the various attributes, improved levels generally do not influence respondents' preferences, with two notable exceptions. First, guaranteeing settlement in western Ukraine increases the probability of acceptance by three percentage points. Second, the policy implemented by the USA increases the likelihood of respondents selecting the alternative package by four percentage points, a result significant at the 10% level. These findings indicate limited but targeted impacts of certain attributes in the presence of the opt-out option.

3.2 | Internal Choice Probability

The internal choice probability focuses exclusively on comparing two alternative AVRR policy packages, without considering the opt-out option. This measure reflects the likelihood that respondents prefer one alternative over the other. While this is not the typical choice that a potential AVRR recipient may face, it is still useful in understanding what attributes may increase a recipient's utility in a situation when the external choice is highly undesirable, such as incarceration or forced deportation without assistance. As such, these results are still useful for policymakers and academics. As shown in Figure 1, the highest attribute levels have a notable impact on the choices of the respondents–more is almost always better. For the Financial Assistance attribute, increasing the amount from USD 1500 (baseline) to USD 3000, USD 6000 and USD 12,000 raises the choice probability by 10 percentage points, 15 percentage points and 23 percentage points, respectively. Similarly, for Housing Support, offering 1 year of



FIGURE 1 | Main results. The acceptance rate at the baseline for the external choice was 0.749. The regression table is reproduced in the Table S1.

rent (level 3) and 2 years of rent (level 4) increases the likelihood of selection by 11 percentage points and 18 percentage points, respectively. For Settlement Guarantees, guaranteeing settlement in Western Ukraine improves respondents' choice probability by seven percentage points compared with the baseline of no guarantee. Regarding the Provider attribute, respondents demonstrate a preference for policies implemented by the USA, EU and Japan compared with those implemented by Ukraine, with these options increasing the likelihood of selection by 20 percentage points, 19 percentage points and 22 percentage points, respectively, showing that respondents trust western partners over the Ukrainian government in implementing a hypothetical policy. Finally, for the Business Loan attribute, providing loans of USD 5000, USD 10,000 and USD 20,000 (compared to no loan) increases respondents' choice probabilities by 13%, 21% and 25%, respectively.

It is possible that the results may be driven by respondents' reckoning of the likelihood of war outcomes. To address this concern, we have conducted additional analysis with the sample broken down across those with a positive ($N=196$, 81%), neutral ($N=38$, 16%) or negative ($N=8$, 3%) evaluation of Ukraine's war prospects as of summer 2024. The outcomes of this analysis is available in the Data S1 section titled 'Results By Belief in Ukraine's Victory'. While the results largely remain consistent across belief in Ukrainian victory, there were slightly different results for those who did not believe in Ukrainian victory, wherein the impact of US implementation became significantly negative, instead of positive.

3.3 | Marginal Means

Figure 2 represents the same empirical results as Figure 1, but with marginal means. Unlike the coefficient plot, which shows AMCEs, or the percentage point change that each attribute level makes relative to baseline, this shows the marginal means, or the mean outcome for each feature, averaged across all levels of all the other attributes. For the external choice, overall selection rates are high (~80%–85%) across all attributes, but not significantly different from each other. For the internal choice analysis, higher financial assistance ($12,000) significantly increases the marginal mean probability of choosing the proposal to 60%, compared to 38% for the lowest level ($1500). Similarly, longer housing support (2 years) significantly increases the likelihood of selection (~60%), compared to shorter durations. Skill training has a strong effect (~57%); employment support is highly valued. Implementation by international actors (USA, EU, Japan) results in higher acceptance rates (~54%–56%), compared to Ukraine.

4 | Discussion and Conclusion

This analysis applies RCE methods to the pertinent question of what features of AVRR policies make them attractive to potential policy recipients. Doing so, we show that increasing financial support results in a higher choice probability in a forced choice between packages. However, in the more realistic scenario where one examines the drivers of AVRR package choice over the status quo in the external choice analysis, the results are different. In accordance with past research (Alrababah et al. 2023), safety turned out to be a significant factor that increases uptake. Providing business loans may increase uptake over no loan, but for a sum well above the typical microloan provided in AVRR policies. Finally, we also show some evidence that the country implementing the reintegration policy may influence uptake.



FIGURE 2 | Main results (marginal means). This represents the same empirical results as Figure 1 in the main text. Unlike the coefficient plot, which shows AMCEs, or the percentage point change that each attribute level makes relative to baseline, this shows the marginal means, or the mean outcome for each feature, averaged across all levels of all the other attributes.

As the analysis shows, while respondents prefer policies with more assistance across all types when comparing across policies, not all of these factors translate to choosing the policy over the status quo. Given that the latter is a more realistic choice, this should be more informative for what policymakers may wish to achieve—maximising the policy uptake (and presumably the welfare of the policy recipient) while minimising cost.

Most surprisingly, increases in financial assistance—the most fungible attribute—have little marginal impact. Those who were not willing to accept the policy at $1500 could not be convinced for double, quadruple or octuple that sum. This would indicate that beyond the sums typically offered for AVRR, there may be diminishing returns for policy uptake unless other issues, such as safety, are addressed.

This finding lends further credence to existing findings from works such as Alrababah et al. (2023) that refugees are typically unwilling to trade safety off for other benefits, and that some threshold of safety must be met before other factors are considered. However, the magnitude of our finding is quite surprising; the offer of USD 12,000 is 2 years of a typical Ukrainian salary (assuming that the monthly paycheck is around USD 500 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2022)).

A major limitation of this study was the peculiar nature of the population studied. Ukrainian evacuees in Japan may differ from the bulk of Ukrainian refugees residing mainly in Russia, Germany and Poland, to say nothing of the differences between our subject population and the typical target of AVRR policies. Crucially, AVRR policies are often targeted at rejected asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, for whom the status quo may be deportation without return and reintegration assistance, rather than staying in the host country (Webber 2011). Japan, although a prolific user of AVRR policy (Kalicki 2020), is also an atypical host, with relatively small foreign and refugee populations. Finally, the survey was conducted through a convenience sample, which limits the generalisability of these results to the target population, though we were able to survey about one in ten Ukrainian evacuees in Japan at the time. These are necessary limitations given the hard-to-reach nature of typical AVRR target populations, and the researchers have been able to reach the Ukrainian evacuee community in Japan through cultural events and other community gatherings.

These limitations highlight the need to replicate this study on groups that are more typically subject to AVRR policies, and perhaps with representative samples, though a sampling frame may be difficult to construct given the nature of the target population. Doing so would allow researchers to understand how different target populations may react differently and how individuals facing varied external choices (i.e., facing deportation or a more hostile environment) may react to AVRR policy attributes. It would also allow policymakers to understand whether adding other attributes (i.e., specific training) may influence uptake. Applying this method more widely would enable researchers and policymakers to better understand the particular needs and preferences of potential AVRR recipient groups. Doing so would allow states to design AVRR policies that are more likely to be accepted and more likely to enhance recipient welfare. Finally, understanding what AVRR policy features actually drive acceptance across different target groups would greatly enhance scholars' understanding of return migration.

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Ethics Statement

This study was approved by the Hiroshima University Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Review Board (application number: HR-LPES-001861). All participants provided informed consent.

Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

Endnotes

[1] The Japanese government chose not to designate Ukrainians fleeing the ongoing conflict as refugees, but rather as evacuees for legal reasons (Takahara 2022). For the purposes of this paper, the researchers will stick to the official terminology.

[2] This is equivalent to around 2 years of a typical Ukrainian salary, given that the prewar median monthly salary was around USD 500 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2022). This sum is also substantially greater than what is typically offered for such programs. For example, Germany offers EUR 1000 and Norway offers around EUR 1500 (Lapa and Bolotov 2024).

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information can be found online in the Supporting Information section. **Data S1.**